egin{abstract}The extent to which Kant agrees with Hume stops at the idea that causal necessity arises from the mind. Whereas Hume purports that causality cannot exist due to the inability for one to observe it and states that what exists is only constant conjunction between events, Kant believes that causality exists, and considers it one of his twelve a priori categories of the mind which, combined with sensory observations, reveal truths in the phenomenal world. Hume’s dismissal of the existence of causality can be construed as slightly superficial, and one would be inclined to Kant’s account to causality as it provides a coherent model to comprehend the idea of causality.end{abstract}egin{multicols*}{2}section{Introduction}Causality is the idea that two events are necessarily connected and thus gives rise to its predictive ability cite{lewis1974causation}. Hume is an empiricist who believes that one can only draw knowledge from experience. He applies this standard to causality and asserts that the inability to observe the cause between two events gives one no logical right to claim the existence of cause and effect. He explains one’s inclination to believe in a necessary connection between two events arises from psychological prejudice, and redefines causality as a constant conjunction between two events cite{hume2003treatise}. Kant agrees with Hume to the extent in which causal necessity has no logical or empirical explanation. Although he agrees that the source of the ostensible causal necessity arises from the mind, he disagrees with Hume on the claim that it is a mental habit. He claims that causal necessity is an a priori mental precondition of all possible experience cite{kant2013immanuel}. This essay will compare Hume’s and Kant’s view on causality and discuss who’s account is more preferable.section{Causal necessity originates from the mind}Both Hume and Kant agree that causality necessarily arises from the mind. Hume makes this conclusion on the nature of causality in his Treatise of Human Nature (1739). Hume’s first principle, as stated in his treatise, is “that there is nothing in any object, considered in itself, (coined as the term `noumena’ by Kant) which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it”. He adds “that even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience”. Hume strongly believes that, for example, by mere observation of a rubber ball, there is no way to predict, a priori, that the ball would bounce upon its contact with the ground from a height. It is from the repeated experience of observing the constant conjunction of many rubber balls falling then bouncing that one forms an expectation of the succeeding event. Hume believes that we require a bridge between a true belief in one matter of fact (the ball hits the ground) and a another (the ball bounces). Hume purports, and Kant agrees, that there requires a premise which would claim “that instances, of which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same”. Hume believes it is impossible to prove this, as one would easily agree that a change in the course of nature could possibly result in a refutation of our expected continual observations. Kant agrees, evident from him questioning in his critique “how can I understand the circumstance that, because something is, something else is to be?”. Kant concedes that the judgement that the effect follows a cause is synthetic, as the predicate is not contained in the cause, and experience is required for one to relate a cause and its effect.section{Kant’s refutation of Hume’s fork}Kant disagrees with Hume that causal necessity arises in the mind out of mental habit. He claims that causal necessity is an a priori mental precondition of all possible experience, and that the mind, via the understanding, applies it categorically and universally to every judgement of objects of sense cite{greenstree_2005}. Kant explains causality as one of his twelve analytic categories of the mind, which exist as the `lenses’ which, together with sensory observations, help us interpret the phenomenal world. Hume classifies objects of knowledge into extit{relations of ideas} and extit{matters of fact}, and purports that relations of ideas are known a priori, certain and a denial of such a proposition implies a contradiction. He defines matters of fact as knowledge that are learnt a posteriori, from experience. Kant terms Hume’s extit{relations of ideas} analytic a priori knowledge, and defines analytic judgments as those whose predicates are wholly contained in their subjects. He terms extit{matters of fact} as synthetic a posteriori knowledge, and defines synthetic judgments as those whose predicates are distinct from their subjects. He goes on to assert that Hume missed out another category, synthetic a priori knowledge, in which causality should lie. Kant comes to this conclusion by first conceding that experience only presents one with constant conjunction of events, not the causal connection, hence knowledge of causation must be a priori and not a posteriori. From his definition, he states with uncertainty that causal judgments are not analytic (in the example where a ball falls, and bounces upon hitting the ground, the `bouncing’ cannot be determined from the subject, `the ball’ without experience). Hence causal judgments have to be classified as synthetic a priori.┬ásection{Kant’s account is preferable from the perspective of coherence theory}Davidson asserts that cite{coherence}section{Bibliography}ibliography{sample}end{multicols*}end{document}

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